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THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF THE DEATH PENALTY
FOR MURDER IN OHIO:
A TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS
WILLIAM C. BAILEY*
F EW, IF ANY, QUESTIONS have been the subject of longer and more heated
discussion than the role of capital punishment in the criminal justice
system in this country. Abolitionists and retentionists have long debated
numerous constitutional and other questions concerning the death penalty,
including: (1) does the death penalty deter capital crimes; (2) does capital
punishment constitute cruel and unusual punishment; (3) does the death
penalty discriminate against the poor, racial and cultural minorities; (4) does
capital punishment actually induce capital crimes; (5) is the penalty inevitably
administered capriciously and arbitrarily; and (6) does the death penalty
disrupt and distort the orderly administration of the criminal justice system?'
Of the relevant issues, none has been the subject of more controversy or
polarized opinion in the criminology literature in recent years than the issue of
the deterrent effect of the death penalty for the crime of murder.2
The deterrence controversy has not been solely confined to academic
circles but rather has also played a role in a number of death penalty cases
recently brought before the United States Supreme Court. For example, in
Furman v. Georgia,3 in which the Court held five to four that the "imposition
and carrying out of the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual
* Associate Dean, College of Graduate Studies and Associate Professor, Department of
Sociology, Cleveland State University. B.A., Central Washington State Univ.; M.A., Ph.D.,
Washington State Univ.
I For a detailed discussion of the legal, moral and other questions that have been long debated
about the role of capital punishment in the criminal justice system, see T. SELLIN, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT (1967); CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNrIED STATES (H. Bedau & C. Pierce eds. 1976);
THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERIcA (H. Bedau ed. 1967).
1 The vast majority of previous empirical investigations have failed to show the death penalty
to be an effective deterrent to murder. See, e.g., OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERv. COMM'N, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT (1961); T. SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY (1959); Bailey, Deterrence and the Death
Penalty for Murder in Utah: A Time Series Analysis, 5 J. CoNTEWp. L. 1 (1978); Bailey,
Imprisonment Versus the Death Penalty as a Deterrent to Murder, 1 L. & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 239
(1977); Bailey, Murder and the Death Penalty, 65 J. CRaM. L. C. & P. S. 416 (1974); Black &
Orsagh, New Evidence on the Efficiency of Sanctions as a Deterrent to Homicide, 58 Soc. Sci. Q.
616 (1978); Bowers & Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac Ehrlich's Research on Capital
Punishment, 84 YALE L.J. 187 (1975); Forst, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A
Cross-State Analysis of the 1960's, 61 MINN. L. REv. 743 (1977); Schuessler, The Deterrent Effect
of the Death Penalty, 284 ANNALS 54 (1952); Sutherland, Murder and the Death Penalty, 51 J. Am.
INsT. CRIM. L. & C. 522 (1925); Passell & Taylor, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment:
Another View (1975) (Discussion paper 74-7509, Columbia University).
In contrast, two recent investigations have presented evidence suggesting that the certainty of
execution may provide an effective deterrent to murder. Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital
Punishment: A Question of Life or Death, 65 AMER. ECON. REV. 397 (1975); Yunker, Is the Death
Penalty a Deterrent to Homicide? Some Time-Series Evidence, 5 J. BEHAVIORAL EGON. 45 (1976).
Both the Ehrlich and Yunker studies have come under very serious criticism because each suffers
from a number of important theoretical and methodological shortcomings. See notes 28-44 infra
and accompanying text.
3 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,"4 the
deterrence question was given explicit recognition. Although the efficacy of
the death penalty as a deterrent to murder did not prove to be of major
significance in the decision in Furman, the Supreme Court did give some
attention to the deterrence question, with Chief Justice Burger's dissent
complaining about the unfortunate lack of clear empirical evidence on this
question and implying the need for more definitive studies on this important
issue.5
In the aftermath of Furman a new round of death penalty research was
launched by social scientists, with the Supreme Court receiving briefs and
hearing oral arguments in a number of capital punishment cases6 in which the
I Id. at 239-40. While in Furman each of the Supreme Court Justices delivered a separate
opinion, a majority of the Court agreed that the death penalty is "cruel and unusual" punishment
because it is imposed infrequently and under no clear standards. Id. at 238. Justice Brennan and
Justice Marshall felt the death penalty to be "cruel and unusual" no matter how administered. Id.
at 257, 314. Justice Stewart and Justice White found the death penalty "cruel and unusual," the
rationale being that it was so rarely and capriciously exacted that it could not serve any social
purpose advanced to justify it. Id. at 306, 310. Justice Douglas concurred that the death penalty
was "cruel and unusual," because as applied it is "pregnant with discrimination" and "not
compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws." Id. at 257.
5 Id. at 395-96 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also the dissent of Justice Powell. Id. at 454-55
(Powell, J., dissenting).
6 On July 2, 1976, the Supreme Court of the United States announced rulings in five cases,
upholding three discretionary death penalty statutes in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976);
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). At the same time
the Court invalidated two others on the ground that these two statutes imposed mandatory
capital punishment, in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) and Roberts v. Louisiana,
428 U.S. 325 (1976). In striking down North Carolina's mandatory death penalty for first degree
murder, the majority of the Court in Woodson concluded that "the respect for humanity
underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires consideration of the character and record of
the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally
indispensable part of the process of imposing the ultimate punishment of death." 428 U.S. at
304. The North Carolina statute was found to impermissibly treat all persons convicted of a
designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings, but as members of a faceless,
undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the death penalty. Id. For the same
reasons as detailed in Woodson, the Court also invalidated Louisiana's mandatory death penalty
for first degree murder in Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 331-36.
In Gregg, the Court ruled that "the punishment of death does not invariably violate the
Constitution." 428 U.S. at 169. A plurality of the Court argued that first degree murder is a grave
crime and it cannot be maintained that the penalty of death is disproportionate in relation to the
crime. "It is an extreme sanction, suitable to the most extreme of crimes," but only providing that
the sentencing jury in a capital case has its discretion suitably directed and limited so as to
minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action. Id. at 188-95. In two other cases
decided on the same day, the death penalty statutes for murder in Florida and Texas were upheld
by the Court upon its holding in Gregg. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 250-60; Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. at 270-77.
As Hugo Bedau has recently pointed out in an analysis of the Court's rulings in Gregg, Jurek,
and Proffitt, the common denominator that emerges from these cases is that capital punishment is
not unconstitutional as long as the statutes under which it is imposed provide, in one way or
another, for: "(1) opportunity to put before the court information about the defendant to assist it
in reaching the sentencing decision, (2) special emphasis on the mitigating factors that affect the
defendant's blameworthiness, (3) common standards to guide trial courts in death sentence cases,
and (4) review of every death sentence by a state appellate court." H. BEDAU, THE CourTS, Tm
CONsTrruTrON, AND CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT 113 (1978).
The Court's rulings concerning mandatory capital punishment resulted in the subsequent
invalidation, either by court decision or by legislative repeal, of the death penalty statutes of
twenty states and in the reduction to life imprisonment of the death sentences of approximately
395 inmates in these states. NAACP LEcAL DEFENSE & EDUC. FuND, INC., DEATH Row, U.S.A. I
(Oct. 23, 1979).
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol28/iss1/6
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findings of these recent studies were of major concern. To a greater degree
than in Furman, the Court did direct its attention to the evidence on
deterrence and the death penalty in at least some of these cases. In Gregg v.
Georgia,7 for example, the Court concluded that "although some of the
studies suggest that the death penalty may not function as a significantly
greater deterrent than lesser penalties, there is no convincing empirical
evidence either supporitng or refuting this view."" Nevertheless, and without
citing any empirical evidence in support of its view, the Court went on to
conclude that for many situations - for example, murder for hire and murder
by a life-term prisoner - "the death penalty undoubtedly is a significant
deterrent."9
As both Bedau 10 and Zeisel" have recently argued in examinations of
Gregg, one can only wonder at the logic of the Supreme Court in concluding
that the empirical evidence on deterrence and the death penalty is simply
inconclusive, but at the same time, and without any empirical evidence,
concluding that the death penalty undoubtedly is a significant deterrent in
some cases. In all fairness the Court is not alone in its view about the
inconclusiveness of the available evidence. For example, after an exhaustive
review of the early and more recent death penalty investigations, the Panel on
Research on Deterrence and Incapacitative Effects of the National Research
Council, National Academy of Science, concluded that the results. of the
analyses on capital punishment "provide no useful evidence on the deterrent
effect of capital punishment." 2 What is required, the Panel concluded, are
investigations that avoid the many methodological limitations that have
plagued this line of research. 13
Despite the fact that most criminologists and other social scientists have
long concluded that the death penalty does not deter murder (or other capital
crimes), the deterrent effect of capital punishment has once again become a
topic of lively debate in the professinal literature. 4 Beginning with a 1975
paper by Isaac Ehrlich which appeared in the American Economic Review, a
number of death penalty investigations focusing specifically upon the issue of
deterrence have recently appeared in leading criminology, economics and
law journals. 15 In these investigations, researchers have attempted to build
See Black, Due Process for Death, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 1 (1976) and England, Capital
Punishment in the Light of Constitutional Evolution, 52 NOTRE DAME LAw. 596 (1977) for
background and analyses of the 1976 capital punishment cases.
7 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
8 Id. at 185.
9 Id. at 185-86.
10 Bedau, New Life for the Death Penalty, 223 NATION 144 (1976).
11 Zeisel, The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty: Facts v. Faiths, 1978 Sup. CT. REv. 317.
12 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL PANEL ON RESEARCH ON DETERRENT AND INCAPAC1TATIVE EFFECTS,
NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 9 (1978).
13 Id. at 62-63.
1 For critiques of the anti-death penalty attitude held by most social scientists, see Jeffery,
Criminal Behavior and Learning Theory, 56 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 294 (1965) and Tullock, Does
Punishment Deter Crime?, 36 PUB. INTEREST 103, 108 (1974).
15 Bailey (1977), supra note 2: Bailey (1974), supra note 2; Black & Orsagh, supra note 2;
Bowers & Pierce, supra note 2; Ehrlich, supra note 2; Yunker, supra note 2.
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upon some of the important limitations of the classic studies by Edwin
Sutherland, Thorsten Sellin, Karl Schuessler and others16 and to bring more
theoretical and methodological sophistication into this line of inquiry.
While these recent investigations have addressed a number of questions
neglected in earlier studies, this renewed research effort has far from settled
the deterrence question. To the contrary, these studies have brought some
investigators to diametrically opposed conclusions and have raised additional
questions about deterrence and the death penalty.
One of these questions and the issue to be examined in this investigation,
concerns the extent to which results and conclusions drawn from these recent
studies can be generalized to Ohio's experience with capital punishment.
Because the classic as well as the more recent death penalty investigations
have typically examined either (1) the relationship between cross-state
variation in execution rates and homicide rates for selected years or (2) the
relationship between execution rates and homicide rates longitudinally over
time for nationally aggregated data, it remains unclear how well the results of
these studies can be generalized to individual jurisdictions. 7 Before
examining this question further and the methodology of the present
investigation, it would seem of value to briefly summarize the findings of both
the classic and the more recent death penalty investigations.
I. REVIEW OF THE LrrAruRE
A. Classic Investigations
The investigations from which most social scientists have traditionally
drawn a negative conclusion about the deterrent effect of capital punishment
have been primarily of two sorts: (1) longitudinal studies of states' homicide
rates before and after the abolition and/or restoration of the death penalty
and (2) cross-sectional analyses of yearly homicide rates for retentionist and
abolitionist states. Contrary to the deterrence hypothesis, these studies have
typically shown (1) homicide rates to be higher, and not lower, in death
penalty jurisdictions and (2) no significant change in the level of homicides
that can be attributed to abolition or restoration of capital punishment.18
In addition, at least two cross-state examinations of the relationship
between the certainty of execution and homicide rates in retentionist states
have failed to show a significant inverse relationship between these two
factors as the deterrence argument would predict. To the contrary, for the
period 1937 to 1941 examined by Schuessler, 19 only a very slight negative
IS OHIO LEIsLATIVE SERV. COMM'N, supra note 2; T. SELLIN, supra note 2; Schuessler, supra
note 2; Sutherland, supra note 2.
'1 One study conducted by the Ohio Legislative Service Commission in 1961 examined
longitudinally the relationship between execution rates and homicide rates in Ohio for the period
1909 to 1958. OHIO LEISLATIVE SERV. COMM'n, supra note 2. This study suffers from a number of
serious shortcomings which render its conclusions highly suspect. See notes 23-27 infra and
accompanying text.
18 See, e.g., T. SELLrN, CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT 122-24, 135-38 (1967); Bedau, Deterrence and the
Death Penalty: A Reconsideration, 61 J. CiaM. L.C. & P.S. 534 (1971); Schuessler, supra note 2, at
57; Sutherland, supra note 2, at 522.
19 Schuessler, supra note 2.
[Vol. 28:51
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association (r = -. 26, r2 = .067)20 was found between average execution rates
and average homicide rates for 41 death penalty jurisdictions.21 Likewise, in a
replication of Schuessler's study for the five year periods preceding 1967 and
1968, this author also found only a very slight inverse relationship between
execution rates in retentionist states and rates of first degree murder
(r = -.137, 1967; r = -. 194, 1968) and between execution rates and rates of
murder and non-negligent manslaughter combined (r = -. 166, 1967;
r = -.039, 1968).22 These findings lead both Schuessler and this author to
conclude that the evidence for these years does not support the claim that the
death penalty - certainty of execution - provides an effective deterrent to
murder.
In another investigation which is of particular interest here, the Ohio
Legislative Service Commission in 1961 reached a similar conclusion from its
analysis of the relationship between changes in execution rates and homicide
rates in Ohio for the period of years from 1909 to 1959.23 Examining
overlapping two-year periods between these dates (1909-1910, 1910-
1911 . . . 1958-1959), the Commission found the certainty of the death
penalty and homicide rates to be positively associated (r = .48), and not
negatively associated as the deterrence hypothesis would predict. This
analysis led the Commission to conclude that there is no evidence that
executions have any discernable negative effect on homicide rates.24
While the findings of the Ohio study are generally consistent with the
results of many previous investigations, a few important methodological
questions can be raised about this investigation. First, in examining the
deterrence hypothesis, the Ohio Legislative Service Commission made use of
an atypical and biased measure of the certainty of the death penalty for
murder. In contrast to most previous investigators, who have commonly
operationalized the certainty of execution as the number of executions for
murder divided by the number of reported homicides,15 the Commission
defined execution rates as the number of executions for murder divided by the
population of the state of Ohio.26 Because of this operationalization and the
20 Pearson Product Moment Correlation (r) is a statistical procedure designed to measure the
strength of the association between two variables. The r correlation can range from 0.0 (which
usually indicates no association between the two variables) to ±1.00 (which indicates a perfect
association between the two variables). The larger the r coefficient, the stronger the relationship
between the independent variable (executions) and the dependent variable (homicides rates).
Thus if their correlation is positive, it indicates that an increase in executions is associated with an
increase in homicides. If the r coefficient is negative, it indicates that higher execution rates are
associated with lower homicide rates.
When the r coefficient is squared (r2), it provides an indication of the proportion of the
variation in the dependent variable (which can range from 0.0% to 100%) that be accounted for by
the independent variable. A more detailed discussion of the Pearson Product Moment
Correlation can be found in most elementary statistics texts. See, e.g., H. BLALOCK, SOCIAL
STATISTICS 376-85 (2d ed. 1972).
11 Schuessler operationalized his execution rate measure as the number of executions for
murder per 1,000 homicides. Schuessler, supra note 2, at 59-60.
22 Bailey (1974), supra note 2, at 422.
213 OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERv. COMMN, supra note 2.
24 Id. at 46.
22 Bailey (1978), supra note 2; Bailey (1977), supra note 2; Bailey (1974), supra note 2; Black &
Orsagh, supra note 2; Schuessler, supra note 2.
26 OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERV. COMM'N, supra note 2, at 46-47.
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facts that (1) the number of homicides is positively correlated with the size of
the state's population and (2) the number of executions is positively cor-
related with the number of homicides in the state each year, it is certainly
not surprising that the Commission found execution rates and homicide rates
to be positively associated. What remains unclear as a result of this difficulty is
to what extent the Commission's findings might have been altered had it used
a more conventional and theoretically appropriate measure of the certainty of
execution in its analysis.
A second major limitation of the Ohio study results from the Commission's
choice to solely examine the bivariate relationship between execution rates
and homicide rates,2 7 thus ignoring other possibly important etiological
factors that influence homicide rates. Because homicide rates have been
repeatedly shown to be associated with a number of socioeconomic and
demographic factors such as nonwhite population, urban population,
unemployment, etc. which were not incorporated into the Commission's
study, the possible spuriousness of its findings (even if a more appropriate
execution rate measure had been utilized) cannot be ignored. That is, the
Commission's findings may simply be a statistical artifact resulting from
consideration of alternative and important determinants of changes in Ohio's
homicide rates from 1909 to 1959. Until this matter is examined, which is a
major focus of the present investigation, the relevance of the Ohio Legislative
Service Commission study will have to remain an open question.
B. Recent Investigations
As noted above, beginning with a recent and widely known paper by
Ehrlich which appeared in a leading economics journal,2 8 there have been a
handful of rather complex multivariate analyses of the death penalty in the
last few years. In each of these studies there have been attempts to overcome
some of the limitations of previous investigations and thus derive a more
sound understanding of the deterrent effect of the death penalty for murder.
Ehrlich's research examined the certainty of execution-homicide rate
relationship for the period of years from 1933 to 1969, while simultaneously
introducing the following sociodemographic and law enforcement factors
into the analysis as control variables: (1) percent of homicides cleared by
27 Id.
28 Ehrlich, supra note 2. To illustrate the attention that Ehrlich's research has received, before
his article was published in The American Economic Review an unpublished version of his paper,
Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death (1973)
(Working Paper No. 18, National Bureau of Economic Research), was cited at length and with
praise by the Solicitor General of the United States in his Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 35-38 in Fowler v. North Carolina, 285 N.C. 40, 203 S.E.2d 803 (1974), vacated on this
issue, 428 U.S. 904 (1976). Copies of Ehrlich's study were also delivered by the Solicitor General
to the Court.
The attention the Ehrlich study has received is also well evidenced by the number of critiques
and challenges his research has received in the professional literature. See Bailey (1977), supra
note 2; Bailey (1974), supra note 2; Baldus & Cole, A Comparison of the Work of Thorsten Sellin
and Isaac Ehrlich on the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 84 YALE L.J. 170 (1975); Bowers
& Pierce, supra note 2; Forst, supra note 2; Peck, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment:
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arrest; (2) percent of those charged with homicide who were convicted; (3)
number of executions for murder for year (t + 1) as a percent of the
aggregate number of convictions for year t; (4) fraction of the civilian labor
force unemployed; (5) percent of population 14-24 years of age; (6) per
capita income; (7) nonwhite population; (8) civilian population; (9) per
capita expenditures, including national defense, of all governments; (10) per
capita expenditures on police, lagged by one year; and (11) chronological
time. 2
Of greatest concern here are Ehrlich's findings for the certainty of
execution variable. His analysis led him to conclude that "an additional
execution per year over the period in question may have resulted, on average,
in 7 to 8 fewer murders."30
While these findings are in striking contrast to the results of previous
investigations, 31 Ehrlich's research has not gone unchallenged and continues
to be a source of debate more than four years since its publication. Because it
is beyond the scope of the present investigation to thoroughly critique
Ehrlich's study, comment is confined to only its most important limitations.
First, in examining the effect of the executions, Ehrlich fails to differentiate
between "death penalty" and "abolition" jurisdictions in estimating annual
probabilities of execution. This, of course, is terribly misleading since the
probability of execution in abolitionist states is zero.
Second, the validity of Ehrlich's statistical model rests upon the
assumption that the relationship between executions and homicides is the
same throughout the period 1933 to 1969. Both the study by William Bowers
and Glen Pierce 32 and the study by Peter Passell and John Taylor 33 which'
examine varying periods between 1933 and 1969 rejected the assumption of
temporal homogeneity. In fact, their replication of the Ehrlich study for
various periods between 1933 and 1969 consistently revealed a positive
association between executions and homicide,3 4 and not a negative
association as Ehrlich reports.
Third, Ehrlich measured his execution, homicide and control variables on
a national level, thus ignoring the tremendous variation in these factors from
state to state. Again, such a procedure fails to differentiate between "aboli-
tionist" and "death penalty" states. More importantly, it does not take into
consideration the substantial variation in the levels of homicide (in both
types of states) and execution practices (in retentionist jurisdictions) from
state to state. Nor does Ehrlich take into consideration variation from state to
state on his control variables,35 which further renders his analysis highly
suspect.
Fourth, because Ehrlich uses nationally aggregated data in his analysis, it
29 Ehrlich, supra note 2, at 409.
30 Id. at 414.
31 OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERV. COMM'N, supra note 2; T. SELLIN, supra note 2; Bailey (1974), supra
note 2; Schuessler, supra note 2; Sutherland, supra note 2.
32 Bowers & Pierce, supra note 2, at 197-99.
3 Passell & Taylor, supra note 2, at 4-6.
"4 Bowers & Pierce, supra note 2, at 198-99; Passell & Taylor, supra note 2, at 4-6.
3- Ehrlich, supra note 2, at 409.
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remains totally unclear to what extent, if any, his findings can be generalized
to individual jurisdictions for the 1933 to 1969 period. Unfortunately, Ehrlich
fails to even speculate about this matter.
In sum, while Ehrlich should be commended for attempting to bring more
sophistication into death penalty investigations, on the basis of his research
Passell and Taylor conclude that "it is prudent neither to accept nor reject the
hypothesis that capital punishment deters murder."36 Moreover, it must be
emphasized that at least two independent replications of Ehrlich's research
have shown nationally aggregated execution rates and homicide rates to be
positively, and not negatively, associated.37
In another investigation James Yunker 38 further examined the execution-
offense rate relationship by: (1) utilizing an alternative measure of the
certainty of execution, i.e., the actual number of executions per year for
varying periods from 1933 to 1972; (2) considering solely annual unemploy-
ment rates as a control variable; and (3) considering a zero and three-year
time lag model between executions and homicide rate in testing the
deterrence hypothesis. 39
Yunker's research, like Ehrlich's, provides support for the deterrence
hypothesis. For the period 1960 to 1972, which are the only years where
Yunker concludes that the execution-homicide rate relationship can be
properly examined,40 he reports for the three-year time lag model an
unstandardized regression coefficient of B = -2.636 (t = -11.075) 41 and
concludes that "one execution will deter 156 murders." 42 Interestingly,
although the relationship between executions and homicide (B = -6.685) is
more substantial when these two variables are examined within the same year
without a time lag, Yunker rejects this within year model as preferable on the
basis of its lower t value of -3.315. Because he is examining population data for
preselected years, however, one can only speculate why Yunker places so
much weight upon statistical inference and not descriptive measures of
association in his analysis. 43
36 Passell & Taylor, supra note 2, at 12.
'I See notes 32-34 supra and accompanying text.
38 Yunker, supra note 2.
39 Yunker examines the relationship between executions and homicides within the same year
to explore the hypothesis that the death penalty has an immediate (within the year) deterrent
effect on offense rates. He further explores the hypothesis that "it takes a certain amount of time
for the fact of executions to affect the mentalities of potential criminals, so that the aggregate
number of executions in the relatively proximate past [the past three years] has more impact than
the current level [of executions on homicide rates]." Id. at 51.
40 From Yunker's discussion of his findings for the various time periods from 1933 to 1972
(1933-1959,1933-1972,1960-1972), it is unclear why he chose to emphasize the results for the 1960-
1972 period and largely to ignore the results for the other time periods. No sound theoretical or
methodological justification is provided for this decision. It is of particular interest to note that
had Yunker chosen to emphasize these additional findings, he would have had to reject the
hypothesis that the death penalty provides an effective deterrent to murder. For the years 1933 to
1959, executions and homicide rates are positively associated (B = .540) and not negatively
related as the deterrence hypothesis predicts. For the period 1933 to 1972, executions and
homicide rates are negatively associated (B = -. 148) as predicted, but the relationship is very
slight and is not statistically significant. See id. at 60-63. For a discussion and interpretation of the
B coefficient, see the Appendix to this article at pages 71-75 infra.
41 For a discussion and interpretation of the t and B statistics, and a brief introduction to
multiple regression analysis, see the Appendix to this article.
42 Yunker, supra note 2, at 65.
43 For a discussion of the use of statistical inference techniques like the t test with population
(Vol. 28:51
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More importantly, Yunker's research suffers from the same objections
raised above about Ehrlich's study: (1) he aggregates his execution, homicide
and unemployment data on a national and not a state level, and (2) he fails to
differentiate between abolition and retentionist jurisdictions. In addition, he
chooses to ignore his less conclusive findings for the period 1933 to 1959 where
executions were at a more substantial level than for the years 1960 to 1972
where levels of execution were reduced. 44 Accordingly, and at best, Yunker's
reported findings only reflect a limited and atypical period of our national
experience with the death penalty.
II. SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE
The research summarized above fails to provide a consistent pattern of
findings on the deterrent effect of the death penalty for murder. With the
exception of the recent studies by Ehrlich and Yunker, both cross-state and
longitudinal analyses have typically failed to provide support for the
hypothesis of a substantial inverse relationship between the certainty of the
death penalty (execution rates) and homicide rates. Most typically, these two
variables have been found to be either positively associated, or only slightly
negatively associated. In addition, because of the difficulties noted above with
the Ehrlich and Yunker studies, their contrary findings have to be viewed with
extreme caution.
Despite the importance of the above investigations in contributing to a
better understanding of the deterrent effect of the death penalty, the
methodology employed in these studies makes it extremely difficult to
generalize their findings to individual jurisdictions in this country. For
example, while cross-sectional analyses of states for selected years have failed
to show variation in execution rates and homicide rates to be substantially
inversely related, these investigations do not address the relationship between
variation (changes) in execution rates and homicide rates over time within
individual jurisdictions. Similarly, while longitudinal studies of nationally
aggregated data for execution rates and homicide rates for various time
periods also fail to provide general support for the deterrence argument, it is
uncertain whether national patterns may be generalized to individual states'
experiences with the death penalty.
In sum, until the relationship between the certainty of the death penalty
and homicide rates is examined over time within individual jurisdictions, the
findings of the studies summarized above can only be suggestive at best for
individual states. Unfortunately, this question has been largely ignored by
previous death penalty investigators, with the only analysis of this type being
data, and for units of observation (years) that Yunker acknowledges are quite atypical during the
time period in which he would like to make a statistical inference, see the Appendix to this article.
Interestingly, had Yunker based his decision about the superiority of the time lagged versus
non-lagged executions model on the size of the regression coefficients for the 1960 to 1972 period
(B = -2.636, B = -6.685, respectively), and not on the basis of the size of the t values for the two
models (t = -3.315, t = -11.075, respectively), he would have been forced to reject the
deterrence hypothesis for the death penalty because the t value for non-lagged executions is not
statistically significant. See Yunker, supra note 2, at 61.
" This is an important consideration to keep in mind in assessing the merits of Yunker's study.
A common complaint voiced by proponents of the death penalty is that in recent years the level of
executions for murder has been so reduced that the death penalty has been "robbed" of its
deterrent effect. For a discussion of this argument, see Jeffery, supra note 14, at 299.
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conducted for Ohio. However, even this investigation, which was conducted
by the Ohio Legislative Service Commission, fails to adequately address the
deterrence question due to the important methodological limitations
discussed above. 45 As a result, the deterrent effect of the certainty of the death
penalty for murder in Ohio remains a question yet to be systematically
examined.
III. THE PRESENT INVESTIGATION
To avoid the difficulties discussed above and to better understand the
deterrent effect of the death penalty in Ohio, the present study will examine
the hypothesis of a significant inverse relationship between the certainty of
execution and homicide rates in Ohio for the years 1910 to 1962. Five
sociodemographic factors associated with homicide rates are introduced in
the analysis as control variables in considering the relationship between exe-
cutions and homicide rates: (1) proportion male population; (2) proportion
population 20 to 40 years of age; (3) proportion nonwhite population; (4) pro-
portion urban population; and (5) percent unemployment. By considering.
these sociodemographic variables, it will be possible both to control for the
effect of these factors on changes in homicide rates during the above period,
and thus better isolate the effect of the death penalty on homicide, and to com-
pare the relative effect of the sociodemographic factors versus executions on
changes in homicide rates. A description of the execution rate, homicide rate,
and sociodemographic variables, and the method of analysis follows below.
A. Certainty of Execution
To construct a measure of certainty of the death penalty, figures were
required on the number of executions for homicide in Ohio each year. In
previous investigations46 execution figures have typically been obtained from
the Federal Bureau of Prison's National Prisoner Statistics series. It was not
possible to use those data here because execution figures are available from
this source only from 1930. As a result, a certainty measure was constructed
with alternative execution data compiled by Teeters and Zibulka. 47 The
Teeters-Zibulka Inventory, recently published in its entirety by Bowers, 48
provides a detailed summary of executions for homicide in Ohio for the
period of years from 1885 to 1963.
Similar to previous investigations,4 9 certainty of the death penalty
(execution rates) was operationally defined as the total number of executions
for homicide for each year divided by the total number of reported homicides
each year. This procedure resulted in an execution rate value for each year
that can theoretically range from zero (0) to unity (1.0). A value of zero would
45 See notes 23-27 supra and accompanying text.
41 Bailey (1977), supra note 2; Black & Orsagh, supra note 2; Bowers & Pierce, supra note 2;
Ehrlich, supra note 2; Forst, supra note 2; Schuessler, supra note 2; Yunker, supra note 2; Passell &
Taylor, supra note 2.
47 Teeters & Zibulka, Executions Under State Authority - An Inventory, in EXECuTiONS IN
AMERICA 199 (W. Bowers ed. 1974).
48Id.
19 See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
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indicate that there were no executions for homicide in the state during the
year, while a value of one would indicate an equal number of homicides and
executions during the year.50
B. Homicide Rates
While first degree murder 5' is generally the only form of homicide
punishable by death, deterrence investigators have typically operationalized
this offense as either (1) homicide, making use of figures from the National
Center for Health Statistics,52 or (2) murder and non-negligent manslaughter,
making use of statistics from the Uniform Crime Reports.53 This practice has
been necessitated by the fact that there are no alternative statistics available
specifically on capital homicides in this country (or for Ohio). As a result of
-0 Although it would have been of interest here to also examine the conditional probability of
execution (given arrest, conviction and/or imprisonment for murder) as a measure of the
certainty of the death penalty, such an analysis could not be conducted due to the unavailability
of necessary arrest, conviction, and imprisonment data for many of the years considered here.
Only for two years (1950, 1960) during the time period examined in this study (1910-1962) are
figures available from Federal Bureau of Prisons publications on the number of convicted
murderers that were imprisoned in Ohio. No figures are available from either Ohio or federal
authorities on the annual number of murder arrests or convictions for the 1910 to 1962 period.
51 For the time period under consideration in this study (1910-1962), Ohio provided for the
death penalty or life imprisonment for murder in the first degree, the last effective statute being
section 2901.01 of the Ohio Revised Code:
No person shall purposely, and either of deliberate and premeditated malice, or by
means of poison, or in perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate rape, arson, robbery, or
burglary, kill another.
Whoever violates this section is guilty of murder in the first degree and shall be
punished by death unless the jury trying the accused recommends mercy, in which case
the punishment shall be imprisonment for life.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01 (Page 1954) (repealed 1974).
In 1972 murder in the first degree was replaced by the offense of aggravated murder as the
only form of capital homicide in Ohio:
(A) No person shall purposely, and with prior calculation and design, cause the
death of another.
(B) No person shall purposely cause the death of another while committing or
attempting to commit, or while fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to
commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson or arson, aggravated robbery or robbery,
aggravated burglary or burglary, or escape.
(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of aggravated murder, and shall be
punished as provided in section 2929.02 of the Revised Code.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01 (Page 1975).
At the present time Ohio is without a death penalty for murder. The United States Supreme
Court struck down Ohio's death penalty law, OHIO REV. CODE Ann. §§ 2929.03-.04, on July 3,1978
in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), and Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978). For a discussion of
the Lockett and Bell rulings, and subsequent legislative developments, see notes 77-86 infra and
accompanying text.
12 The U.S. Public Health Service includes in its homicide category all deaths resulting from
an injury purposely inflicted by another person, with intent to kill not being required to classify a
death as a homicide. Homicide data are compiled by the Public Health Service from microfilm
copies of original death certificates gathered by the agency from throughout the country. U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., HOMICIDE IN THE UNITED STATES:
1950-1964 SERIES 20, No. 6 (1967).
53 The Federal Bureau of Investigation collects from local police departments murder rates
for Ohio and other jurisdictions of the country. The Bureau offense category of murder and non-
negligent manslaughter includes all willful felonious homicides, as distinguished from deaths
caused by negligence. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FED. BURAU OF INVESTIGATION UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS: CRIMES IN THE UNITED STATES - 1977 at 7 (1978).
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this practice, investigators have had to assume, whether they use law
enforcement or public health figures, that the ratio of first degree murders to
total homicides is a constant from state to state and year to year, so that the
more inclusive homicide data provide a reasonably good indicator of capital
offenses. While the author's findings for 1967 to 1968, which show a similar
relationship between states' execution practices and rate of first degree
murder, and Federal Bureau of Investigation figures for homicide would
appear to support this assumption, its validity remains unknown for other
years .54
In the absence of theoretically appropriate data on first degree murder,
homicide figures for Ohio were secured from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's Uniform Crime Reports for the years 1933-62 and National
Center for Health Statistics Compilation for the period 1910-32. Although the
homicide offense category used by the Bureau more closely corresponds to
first degree murde, than that used by the U.S. Public Health Service,"
reasonably compl. -e Federal Bureau of Investigation's figures are only
available from the year 1933. As a result, to extend the analysis to two prior
decades, public health service figures were used as an index of capital
homicides for this period.
C. Sociodemographic Variables
For the purpose of extending the analysis beyond a simple bivariate
examination of the relationship between executions and homicide, five
sociodemographic factors associated with homicide were introduced into the
analysis as control variables: (1) proportion urban population; (2) proportion
nonwhite population; (3) percent unemployment; (4) proportion male pop-
ulation; (5) proportion population 20 to 40 years of age. Data for these
variables were gathered from census figures.5 6
While it was the intention of this study to examine the multivariate
relationship between executions, the sociodemographic factors and homicide
for each year between 1910 and 1962, this was not possible. Unfortunately,
complete control data was only available for the six census years (1910, 1920,
1930, 1940, 1950, 1960). Rather than restricting the analysis to only these years,
the two-year periods immediately preceding and immediately following each
census year were also examined, and the respective census figures were used
-4 Bailey (1974), supra note 2. Note that the Ohio Legislative Service Commission also made
use of criminal homicide data in its analysis, but not figures for first degree murder. OHIO
LEGISLATIVE SERV. COMM'N, supra note 2, at 47.
5 See notes 52-53 supra.
5 The sociodemographic variables were chosen on the basis of their use, or the use of similar
variables, in previous deterrence and death penalty investigations. See Bailey (1977), supra note
2; Black & Orsagh, supra note 2; Bowers & Pierce, supra note 2; Ehrlich, supra note 2; Passell &
Taylor, supra note 2; Yunker, supra note 2. By considering the same, or similar, sociodemographic
variables, it will thus be possible to better compare the findings of this study with those of
previous investigations.
The sociodemographic data were secured from the following: U.S. DEI'T OF COMMERCE,
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF THE POPULATION: 1960 (1964); CENSUS OF THE POPULATION: 1950
(1953); ABSTRACT OF THE SIXTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITE STATES (1943); ABSTRACT OF THE
FITEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNrED STATES (1933); ABSTRACT OF THE FOURTEENTH CENSUS OF THE
UNrED STATES (1923); and U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE & LABOR, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
THIRTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES (1914).
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as the best available estimate for the control variables for these pre-census and
post-census periods.
5 7
D. Method of Analysis
The execution, sociodemographic and homicide variables were fit into a
multiple regression analysis,58 with three models of the certainty of execution-
homicide rate relationship being examined. To test the possible immediate
deterrent effect of capital punishment on homicide, the relationship between
the execution and offense rate variables was first examined within the same
year. This model rests upon the assumption that the general public, including
would-be killers, is more affected (deterred) by its impression of current
levels of homicide and executions than by more distant former levels of
execution.
Second, the execution-offense relationship was examined by building in a
one-year time lag between execution rates (year t-1) and homicide rates (year
t). Using this procedure, executions for 1909 were compared to homicides for
1910, and executions for each year were then compared with homicide rates
for each following year through 1962.
Third, to examine the possibility that execution rates not only may
influence homicide rates, but that homicide rates may also influence the level
of use of the death penalty (execution rates), a two-stage analysis procedure
was utilized.59 Homicide rates for the previous year (t-1) were first regressed
against execution rates for each year (t), and then homicide rates for each year
(t) were regressed against the resulting residual execution rates for year t,
controlling for the sociodemographic variables.
In considering each of the three models of the execution rate-homicide
rate relationship, two homicide measures are utilized. First, as with most
longitudinal studies, homicide rates for each of the individual years are used
as a measure of the dependent variable. By using this measure, the
comparisons of present findings with those of previous studies are facilitated.
Second, average homicide rates for two-year periods [(years t + t+1)/2] are
11 To illustrate, census figures for 1920 were used as estimates of the control variables in
examining the execution-offense rate relationship for 1918, 1919, 1920, 1921, and 1922. This
procedure was followed for each of the six pre-census and post-census periods (with the
exception of the pre-census years of 1908 and 1909 where accurate execution and homicide data
were not available), thus yielding a total of 28 years where the execution-homicide relationship
could be examined longitudinally for the state. In the absence of a sound theoretical rationale, we
chose not to interpolate figures for the control variables for the remaining inter-census years.
18 See the Appendix to this article for a discussion of multiple regression analysis, and see also
the statistics resulting from this technique that are reported in Tables 1-6, pages 76-81 infra.
59 To illustrate how execution rates may influence the level of homicides and also how the level
of homicide may influence the level of use of the death penalty, consider the following example.
Community A, with a low level of homicides during year (t-I), may respond to this situation with a
low level of executions during year t. If the level of homicides does not change in community A
from year (t-l) to year t, the relationship between execution rates and homicide will be positive.
Conversely, community B, with a high level of homicides during year (t-l), may respond by
increasing the level of executions during year t. If the level of homicides in community B is not
immediately reduced within the year t, then the association between executions (year t) and
homicides (year t) will be positive. While in both of these types of situations executions may be
accomplishing a deterrent effect to some degree, responses to homicides like those noted here
would confound the certainty-rate relationship by introducing "positive pressure" into a
correlation analysis between executions and homicide rates.
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used as an additional measure of the dependent variable.6 0 This type of
homicide measure has also been used in some previous death penalty
investigations6' and has two advantages over the former measure: (1) it adds
greater stability to the homicide index by reducing the effect of measurement
error; and (2) it permits a better examination of the immediate (year t) as well
as the possible delayed (year t+1) deterrent effect of executions on homicide.
IV. FINDINGS
Table 162 reports the results of the analysis where execution rates and
homicide rates are examined within the same years (top half of the table) and
execution rates for each year are compared with mean homicide rates [(year t
+ t+1)/2] for two-year periods (lower half of the table). In each analysis the
findings are very comparable when both homicide measures are utilized.
As noted above, consistent with the deterrence hypothesis one would
expect a significant inverse (negative) relationship between the certainty of
execution and homicide rates. Neither analysis provides support for this
hypothesis. When execution rates and homicide rates are examined within the
same year, the execution coefficient (B = -. 0450) falls in the predicted negative
direction but is not statistically significant (F = .070).63 Rather, only a very
slight trade off is observed between these two variables, with a one percent
increase in executions only being associated with about 4.5 one-hundredth of
a person reduction in the homicide rate.6 4 Likewise, when mean homicide
rates are used as a measure of the dependent variable, the trade off between
executions and homicide is also very slight (B = -. 0367), and not statistically
significant (F =.111). In this analysis a one percent increase in the certainty of
execution is associated with only about 3.7 one-hundredth of a person
reduction in the homicide rate.
Examination of the standardized regression coefficients (beta weights)
further illustrates the insignificant effect of executions on homicide rates. 65 Of
the six independent variables considered, the certainty of execution ranks last
in importance in each analysis behind the sociodemographic variables as a
determinant of homicide. Judged by the size of the beta values, proportion
male population proves to be the best predictor of homicide, followed by
the age and proportion urban population variables. The proportion nonwhite
population and percent unemployment variables follow next, although the F
values show nonwhite population not to be significantly associated with
either measure of homicide.
Table 266 reports the results of the analysis when a one-year time lag is built
60 With this homicide measure, execution rates for 1910 are compared with mean homicide
rates for 1910 and 1911, and so forth, ending with execution rates for 1962 being compared with
mean homicide rates for 1962 and 1963.
61 OHm L.GISLATIVE SERV. CoMM'N, supra note 2; Bailey (1978), supra note 2; Bailey (1977),
supra note 2.
62 See page 76 infra.
63 For a discussion and interpretation of the B and F statistics, see the Appendix to this article.
64 For a discussion and interpretation of the beta statistics, see the Appendix to this article.
65 Id.
66 See page 77 infra.
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in in examining the relationship between execution rates (year t-1) and
homicide rates (year t). This analysis is simply a replication of that reported in
Table 1, but with the substitution of a new execution rate measure.
The findings exhibited in Table 2 almost exactly parallel the results of the
earlier analysis for both the execution and sociodemographic variables.
Again, the execution coefficients (B values) are of a negative sign when both
homicide rates (-.0452) and mean homicides (-.0156) are considered, but
they are very slight in magnitude and are not statistically significant. For
neither measure of the dependent variable is a one percent increase in the
certainty of execution associated with as much as a 5.0 one-hundredth of a
person reduction in the homicide rate.
As before, these findings reject the deterrence hypothesis of a significant
inverse relationship between the certainty of the death penalty and homicide
rates. Rather, the beta results reported in Table 2 (as in Table 1) indicate that
changes in the sociodemographic conditions in the state, with the exception of
the insignificant nonwhite population variable (F - 1.495, F = 1.942), are far
more important determinants of changes in homicide rates than the certainty
of the death penalty.
As discussed above 6 7 our third model of the relationship between the
certainty of the death penalty and homicide takes into consideration the
possibility that both execution rates may influence homicide rates (deter-
rence) and levels of homicide may influence levels of use of the death
penalty. To examine this question, homicide rates (year t-1) were first
regressed against execution rates (year t), and then homicide rates (year t),
and mean homicide rates [(year t + (t+l))/2] were regressed against residual
execution rates. This analysis is simply a replication of the two previous
analyses (Tables 1 and 2), but with the substitution of a new residual execution
rate measure. Results are reported in Table 3.68
Once again, Table 3 reveals a pattern of finding very similar to the two
previous models. While residual execution rates and homicide rates are
negatively associated, the relationship is slight and not statistically significant
for either homicide measure. When mean homicide rates are used as a
measure of the dependent variable, the unstandardized coefficient shows a
one percent increase in the certainty of the death penalty to be associated with
about a 7.9 one-hundredth (B = -. 0788) of a person reduction in the homicide
rate. In slight contrast, the B coefficient (-.3012) is somewhat more substantial
when homicide and execution rates are examined within the same year. Here
a one percent increase in the certainty of the death penalty is associated with
about a 3.0 tenths of a person reduction in the homicide rate. Even this finding
must be viewed with extreme skepticism, however, due to the insignificant F
value (.649) associated with the execution coefficient.
As before, examination of the standardized beta coefficients also indicates
the insignificance of the execution rate variable. A comparison of the beta
values shows executions to rank last in importance of the variables
considered. With the exception of the nonwhite variable (beta = -. 9227, F =
2.134), each of the remaining sociodemographic factors proves to be
67 See notes 58-61 supra and accompanying text.
68 See page 78 infra.
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significantly related to both homicide rate measures, with each of these
variables being better predictors of homicide than the certainty of execution
(beta = -. 0583, F = .649).
A. Nonlinearity of the Execution-Homicide Rate Relationship
The analysis to this point has solely considered the possible linear
relationship between execution rates (and the sociodemographic variables)
and homicide rates. The possibility exists, however, that the relationship
between these variables is actually nonlinear and that the above analysis is
accordingly biased.69 To test this possibility, log transforms were performed
on both homicide measures, and each of the three execution rate-homicide
rate models were reconsidered. 70 Results of this analysis are presented in
Tables 4 through 6.
Table 471 reports the findings when execution rates for each year are
regressed against transformed homicide rates during the year and transform-
ed mean homicide for two-year periods.
The findings in Table 4 are comparable to those of the earlier analysis
69 The analysis reported in Tables 1-3 rests upon the assumption that a one unit (percent)
increase in execution rates will have the same magnitude effect on homicide rates, regardless of
the level of executions, i.e., the execution-homicide rate relationship is linear. For example, the
linear analysis assumes that an increase in execution rates from five to ten percent will have the
same proportional effect on homicide rates as an increase in execution rates from ten to fifteen
percent. Likewise, the linear statistical model assumes that the rate of increase or decrease in
homicide rates is of the same magnitude for the full range of the execution variable.
While linear models are commonly used in social science research, and often will approximate
the form of the relationship between predictor and dependent variables, there has been some
speculation that the relationship between the certainty of legal sanctions and offense rates is
actually nonlinear. Charles Tittle and Alan Rowe, for example, argue that the probability of
punishment (in this case the certainty of the death penalty) must reach a critical, but unknown,
level before legal sanctions can achieve a significant deterrent effect on offense behavior (in this
case homicide rates). Tittle & Rowe, Certainty of Arrest and Crime Rates: A Further Test of the
Deterrence Hypothesis, 52 Soc. FoRcEs 456 (1974). Conversely, the possibility exists that once the
certainty of the death penalty reaches some unknown level, additional increases in execution rates
will not achieve a greater deterrent effect on homicide rates, i.e., execution rates may reach a
point of diminishing returns at some level.
Although Tittle and Rowe are concerned with the possible non-linear relationship between
arrest rates and felony rates, a number of deterrence and death penalty investigations have
explored the possible nonlinear relationship between executions and homicides and the
hypothesis that the certainty of execution must reach a certain level (a tipping point) before
execution rates will achieve a significant deterrent effect on homicide rates. See note 70 infra.
To test the possible nonlinear relationship between execution rates and homicide rates in
Ohio, log transforms were performed on the homicide rate variables. This has been the
procedure followed in previous deterrence and death penalty studies. See note 70 infra.
Accordingly, it will thus be possible to compare the findings of these studies with the results of the
present investigation for Ohio.
'0 The log analysis reported in Tables 4-6 is simply a replication of that which appears in
Tables 1-3, but with the substitute of transformed homicide rates. Accordingly, it will be possible
to compare the respective findings reported in Tables 1-3 with those in Tables 4-6 to determine if
a linear or non-linear model better describes the relationship between execution rates (and the
sociodemographic variables) and homicide rates.
Log transforms have also been used in previous deterrence and death penalty investigations to
test the linearity (non-linearity) question. See Bailey (1978), supra note 2; Bowers & Pierce, supra
note 2; Ehrlich, supra note 2; Passell & Taylor, supra note 2. With the exception of the Ehrlich
study, these investigations have failed to find support for the deterrence hypothesis for the death
penalty, but the possible nonlinear relationship between execution rates and homicide rates
remains unknown for Ohio for the time period examined in the present investigation.
71 See pages 79-81 infra.
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when the same execution measure was used, e.g. Table 1. First, consistent
with the deterrence hypothesis, the partial regression coefficients are of a
negative sign when homicide rates and mean rates are considered (B = -.0042,
B = -.0036, respectively). They fail to reach statistical significance, however,
with the F values being very low (F < .05). Second, compared to the
sociodemographic variables, the beta results again show execution rates to be
the least adequate predictor of yearly (-.0118) and mean (-.0104) homicide
rates. Third, and somewhat in contrast to the earlier findings, each of the
sociodemographic variables proves to be significantly related to homicide
rates, with the beta coefficients showing proportion nonwhite population
to be the best predictor of offense rates.
Table 572 exposes a very similar pattern of findings when execution rates
lagged by one-year (t-i) are regressed against the transformed homicide
variables.
Like Tables 2 and 4, the execution rate coefficients are negative for yearly
(B = -. 0038) and mean homicide rates (B = -.0021), but the coefficients are
slight and are not statistically significant. In addition, the beta coefficients
again show the certainty of the death penalty (beta < -.01) to be the least
adequate predictor of homicide, with the proportion nonwhite (beta > -1.6)
being the best predictor of both homicide rates.
To round out the analysis, transformed homicide rates were regressed
against residual execution rates (as used in Table 3), with results being
reported in Table 6.73
As before, the execution variable proves to be negatively associated with
both yearly (B = -. 0431) and mean (B = -.0061) offense rates, but the
coefficients are slight and are not statistically significant. This analysis further
demonstrates each of the sociodemographic variables to be more strongly
associated with homicide, with proportion nonwhite population again
proving to be the best predictor of homicide rates (beta = -1.8336) and mean
homicide rates (beta = -1.5938).
In sum, examination of transformed homicide rates (Tables 4-6) resulted
in some different findings from the earlier analysis (Tables 1-3) for the socio-
demographic variables. Whereas proportion male population proved to be
the best predictor of homicide rates (while proportion nonwhite population
was not found to be significantly related to homicide rates), proportion non-
white population was found to be the factor most strongly associated with log
homicide rates. Consistently throughout each stage of the analysis, however,
execution rates and homicide rates were not found to be significantly related
as the deterrence hypothesis predicts. Moreover, of the variables considered,




This investigation has examined an important but largely neglected
72 See page 80 infra.
" See page 81 infra.
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question concerning capital punishment in Ohio, namely, the deterrent effect
of the certainty of execution on homicide rates. Considering 28 years during
the period 1910 to 1962, three models of the relationship between execution
rates and homicide rates were considered, with selected sociodemographic
factors being introduced into the analysis as control variables. In each stage of
the analysis, the deterrence hypothesis of a significant inverse relationship
between the certainty of execution and homicide rates was tested.
Consistent with the findings of most previous cross-sectional in-
vestigations of states and longitudinal examinations of nationally aggregated
data,' 4 the instant analysis fails to provide support for the deterrence
hypothesis for Ohio. Rather, this study consistently revealed only a very
slight, nonsignificant negative association between the certainty of execution
and offense rates when each execution rate-homicide rate model was
examined and when two measures of homicide were utilized.
In addition, throughout the analysis each of the following sociodemo-
graphic factors consistently proved to be better predictors of homicide than
the certainty of execution: proportion male population, proportion popula-
tion 20-40 years of age, proportion nonwhite population, percent urban
population, percent unemployment. Although the results for these socio-
demographic variables were found to vary somewhat in the multivariate
linear and nonlinear analyses (proportion male population was found to be
the best predictor of homicide in the linear analysis, and proportion nonwhite
population in the nonlinear analysis), the standardized beta coefficients for
execution rates were very consistent. 75 Comparison of the beta values for the
execution variable and the least adequate sociodemographic predictor of
homicide rates shows the least adequate sociodemographic variable, on
average, to be more than a 95 percent better predictor of homicide rates than
the certainty of executions. Or put differently, the execution beta coefficients
only average about five percent the size of the beta values for the
sociodemographic variable least strongly associated with homicide rates.
These findings lead to the same conclusion that has been repeatedly drawn
from numerous previous investigations. 76 The evidence for Ohio provides no
support for the argument that the certainty of the death penalty provides an
effective deterrent to homicide. Rather, execution rates and homicide rates
prove to be largely independent factors, with offense rates being a response to
the changing demographic characteristics and socioeconomic conditions of
the state. Accordingly, while a number of justifications can and have been
provided for the use of the death penalty for murder (including retribution,
permanent incapacitation, normative validation, etc.), Ohio's experience with
capital punishment during the last six decades does not support retentionist
arguments based upon deterrence.
" OIFo LEGISLATIVE SERV. COMM'N, supra note 2; T. SELLIN, supra note 2; Bailey (1978), supra
note 2; Bailey (1977), supra note 2; Bailey (1974), supra note 2; Black & Orsagh, supra note 2;
Bowers & Pierce, supra note 2; Schuessler, supra note 2; Sutherland, supra note 2; Passell &
Taylor, supra note 2.
15 No fully satisfactory explanation can be provided to answer why the findings (relative size
of the beta weights) for the proportion nonwhite population variable differ in the linear and
nonlinear analysis. However, these mixed results are not of concern in assessing the affect of the
variable of primary interest in this investigation, namely, the certainty of the death penalty.
76 See note 74 supra.
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B. Application to Legislative Action
On July 3, 1978, the Supreme Court of the United States struck down
Ohio's death penalty statute, Ohio Revised Code § 2929.03-.04, in Lockett v.
Ohio77 and Bell v. Ohio, 78 holding that the Ohio law was unconstitutional
because it did not allow broad enough consideration to be given to mitigating
factors in sentencing.79 The Court in Lockett observed that the "Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind
of capital case, not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor any
aspect of the defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of
the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death."80 The Lockett and Bell decisions spared the lives of 101 convicted
murderers on Ohio's death row.8"
Since the Lockett and Bell decisions, Ohio has been without the death
penalty for aggravated murder. Immediately after the Supreme Court's
ruling in these cases, efforts were begun to revise the death penalty law to
comply with the Court's above objection to the Ohio statute. On February 15,
1979, Amended Substitute House Bill 7482 was introduced
to amend sections 2903.01, 2929.02, 2929.03, 2929.04, 2929.41,
2953.02, and 2967.13, and to enact sections 2929.021, 2929.05, and
2929.06 of the Revised Code to provide for sentencing in some capi-
77 438 U.S. 586 (1978). Sandra Lockett was convicted on April 3, 1975, of aggravated murder
with aggravating specifications, i.e., the murder was committed to escape apprehension for, and
while committing or attempting to commit, aggravated robbery. Lockett was sentenced to death
pursuant to statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.03-.04 (Page Supp. 1975). 438 U.S. at 589-94.
The Ohio court of appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed her conviction. Id. at 587.
Lockett made various challenges to the validity of her conviction, including an attack on the
constitutionality of the death penalty statute on the ground that it did not give the sentencing
judge a full opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances in capital cases as required by the
eighth and fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 602. For the permissible statutory mitigating factors to
be considered by the sentencing judge in determining a sentence of death for aggravated murder,
see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (Page Supp. 1975), set out at note 79 infra.
78 438 U.S. 637 (1978). Willie Lee Bell was convicted of aggravated murder with a
specification that it occurred during a kidnapping, and was sentenced to death. The conviction
was affirmed by the Ohio court of appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court. 438 U.S. at 639-42. As in
Lockett, petitioner Bell contended that the Ohio death penalty statute, OHmO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2929.03 (Page Supp. 1975), "violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
because it prevented the sentencing judge from considering the particular circumstances of his
crime and aspects of his character and record as mitigating factors." 438 U.S. at 642.
78 The Ohio law required that once a defendant was found guilty of aggravated murder, Omo
REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.01 (Page Supp. 1978), see note 51 supra, with at least one of the
aggravating circumstances contained in OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A) (Page Supp. 1975),
the death penalty would be imposed under id. § 2929.03(E), unless:
considering the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history, character, and
conditions of the offender, one or more of the following is established by a
preponderance of the evidence: (1) the victim of the offense induced or facilitated it;
(2) it is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but for the fact that the
offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation; (3) the offense was
primarily the product of the offender's psychosis or mental deficiency, though such
condition is insufficient to establish the defense of insanity.
Id. § 2929.04(B)
80 438 U.S. at 604. For more detailed analyses of the Lockett and Bell decisions, see Note,
Constitutional Criminal Law - The Role of Mitigating Circumstances in Considering the Death
Penalty, 53 TUL. L. REV. 609 (1979); Comment, 12 AKRON U.L. REV. 360 (1978).
8I NAACP LEc.AL DEFENSE & Enuc. FUND, INC., DEATH Row, U.S.A. 2 (Oct. 23, 1979).
82 Am. Sub. H.B. 74, 113th Gen. Assy. (1979-80).
19Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1979
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
tal cases by the jury and the court, to permit the sentencing authority
in a capital case to consider and weigh all circumstances that miti-
gate against the imposition of the death penalty, to provide for a
special review by courts of appeals and the supreme court of all
sentences of death, to eliminate felony murder as an aggravating
circumstance for aiders and abettors in murder cases, to require a
person sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment for aggra-
vated murder to serve fifteen or twenty-five years in prison for each
sentence of life imprisonment before being eligible for parole, and
to permit a defendant in certain cases to have the existence of an
aggravating circumstance determined at the sentencing hearing.83
In response to the objections raised by the Supreme Court in Lockett and
Bell about the restricted range of possible mitigating factors to be considered
in sentencing in the Ohio law, the most important aspect of Amended
Substitute House Bill 74 is the allowance for the sentencing authority in a
capital case to consider and weigh all circumstances that mitigate against the
death penalty. Likewise, Amended Substitute House Bill 74 would appear to
provide for the elements that Bedau identifies as the common denominator
that emerged from the Court's earlier rulings in Gregg, Jurek, and Proffitt.84
At this time one can only speculate as to whether a revised death penalty
statute might be approved by the Ohio Senate and House. In addition, if a
new death penalty law is approved for Ohio, it would be premature to
speculate about the exact form the new law might take, and whether it will
successfully comply with the requirements set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in Gregg, Jurek, Proffitt, Lockett, and Bell.85 While only time
will provide answers to these questions, one thing is abundantly clear from the
analysis reported in this article: if Ohio is to reinstate capital punishment, its
justification will have to be based upon grounds other than the deterrent effect
of the death penalty for murder. Notwithstanding the opinion of some
members of the United States Supreme Court, 6 and possibly a majority of the
Ohio House and Senate, the present analysis of Ohio's experience with capital
punishment provides no justification for reinstating the death penalty as an
effective means of dealing with the state's murder problem.
1- Id. at introduction.
84 See note 6 supra. Amended Substitute House Bill 74 was approved and passed out of the
House on February 21, 1979. The bill was introduced into the Ohio Senate on February 22, 1979,
and as of the time of the writing of this article, is in the hands of the Senate Judiciary Committee
which is now conducting public hearings on the proposed legislation. There is presently no
authoritative projection available about when, or even if, a death penalty bill will go before the
full Senate for consideration.
85 See notes 6, 77-80 supra and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX
AN OVERVIEW OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS8 7
Multiple regression analysis provides a general statistical technique
whereby various aspects of the relationship between a dependent variable88
and two or more independent or predictor variables can be examined. While
multiple regression analysis is a useful technique to investigate a wide variety
of statistical questions, it provides the reseacher with a rather straightforward
means of (1) testing the independent effect of each of the predictor variables
on the dependent variable, controlling for the effects of the other predictor
variables of interest on the dependent variable; (2) comparing the relative
effect of each of the predictor variables on the dependent variable; and
(3) assessing the combined predictive power of all of the predictor variables
taken together on the dependent variable.
The following types of statistics may be derived from multiple regression.
First, for each of the predictor variables considered, this analysis yields
unstandardized regression coefficients (commonly termed B coefficients or B
values). B coefficients provide an indication of the effect of each of the
predictor variables on the dependent variable, while simultaneously
controlling for the effects of all of the other predictor variables on the
dependent variable. To illustrate, Yunker reports a B value of -2.636 for his
three-year time lag model.89 In substantive terms, this coefficient indicates
that a one-person increase in the number of executions (a predictor variable)
is associated with approximately a 2.6 person reduction in the homicide rate
(the dependent variable), controlling for the effects of unemployment, which
is Yunker's second predictor variable. The sign of the B value indicates
whether an increase in the predictor variable is associated with either an
increase (+) or a decrease (-) in the level of the dependent variable. The size of
the B coefficient indicates the number of units of increase or decrease in the
dependent variable that results from a one unit increase in the predictor
variable.
Second, because the unit of measurement typically varies for different
predictor variables in a regression analysis (for example, the number of
executions, percent unemployment, median income in dollars, etc.), B
coefficients cannot be directly compared to determine the relative effect of
" This Appendix is not intended to provide a detailed discussion of multiple regression
analysis. Rather, the concern here is with providing a brief outline of the essential features of
multiple regression (in non-technical terms), i.e., how it has been used in the present investigation.
For those not familiar with this statistical technique, the reader is urged to review the Appendix
before reading the Recent Investigations and Findings sections of this article.
For more detailed and technical discussions of multiple regression analysis, see H. BLALOCK,
supra note 20, at 381- 449; A. EDWARDS, AN INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR REGRESSION AND CORRELATION
(1976); J. JOHNSON, ECONOMETmC METrODS 8-67, 121-75 (1972); J. KMENTA, ELEXMNTS OF
EcoNoMErlcs 197-246, 347408 (1971); N. NOMODIRI, L. CARTER & H. BLALOCK, APPUED
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS 1-75 (1975).
Il By convention in the statistical literature, the term "dependent variable" refers to the
variable that one is trying to explain, account for, or predict. In the context of the present
research, and the studies reviewed in this article, the dependent variable of interest is homicide
rates.
1s Yunker, supra note 2, at 61.
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each predictor variable on the dependent variable. To remedy this situation,
standardized regression coefficients (commonly termed beta weights or beta
coefficients) can be computed for each predictor variable that permits such a
comparison. For example, in a situation with two predictor variables, if the
beta weight is 1.0 for variable A and 2.0 for variable B, then it can be
concluded that variable B provides twice as good a predictor of the
dependent variable than variable A. Similarly, in situations where more than
two predictor variables are being considered, the beta coefficients can be rank
ordered to determine the best predictor of the dependent variable, the second
best predictor, and so on, with the smallest beta value indicating the factor
that is the poorest predictor of the dependent variable.
A third statistic commonly reported in regression analyses is the multiple
correlation coefficient, symbolized as R2. The multiple correlation provides
an indication of the amount of the variation in the dependent variable that can
be accounted for by the combined effects of all of the predictor variables that
are being considered. The larger the R2 value (which can range from 0.0 to
1.00), the greater the predictive power of the explanatory variables. 90
Each of the above statistics (B, beta values, R2) are measures that can be
used to describe the relationship between the predictor and dependent
variables for the units (years, states, etc.) that are being directly examined in
the regression analysis. In Yunker's investigation, for example, the B
coefficient of -2.636 that he reports describes the relationship between
executions and homicide rates for the years 1960 to 1972.91 Under certain
conditions, however, additional statistical tests can be computed (t and F
tests) that allow the researcher to make statistical inferences on the basis of
the observed B, beta, and R2 values to a larger population (additional years,
states, etc.) that was not directly considered in the analysis. For example, if the
researcher can safely assume that the years that have been examined in
computing B, beta, and R2 values are representative of other years that were
not included in the analysis, then statistical inference techniques can be
utilized to generalize the observed findings to the larger population. 92
Typically, researchers make use of random sampling techniques93 in selecting
10 An R2 value of 0.0 indicates that the predictor variables being examined are unrelated to the
dependent variable. An R2 value of 1.00 indicates that the predictor variables in combination
explain the total variation (100%) in the dependent variable.
91 Yunker, supra note 2, at 61.
92 In this discussion the term population refers to the universe in which the researcher wishes
to make a generalization. For example, in the research reported in this article, the author wishes to
make a generalization about the relationship between execution rates (controlling for
sociodemographic factors) and homicide rates during the period 1910 to 1962. In order to make
an inference about this time period (the population or universe of interest), a sample of 28 years
has been selected for examination in the statistical analysis.
13 The underlying principle of random sampling is rather straightforward. For a variety of
reasons (time limitations, expense, etc.), it is often not possible to examine a complete population
in testing a hypothesis about how two variables, for example, relate in the population. It is often
possible, however, to directly examine a subset of the population of interest. If this subset - a
sample - is representative of the larger population, then the pattern of findings observed for the
sample can be generalized to the larger population.
One way to try to achieve a representative sample of a population is to select a sample on a
random basis where each unit (state, year, etc.) in the population has an equal chance of being
included/excluded in the sample to be studied. A wide variety of random sampling techniques is
available to the researcher, but they all have one important feature in common. Since each unit in
the population has an equal probability of being included in the sample, there is no a priori reason
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the units to observe (for example, a sample of years to examine from a more
extended time period) in attempting to meet the assumption that the units that
have been examined are representative of a larger population. Here the
concern is with the possible effect of sampling error and with the effect the
examination of a set of atypical observations may have in reaching a biased
generalization about a hypothesized relationship in the population.
Generally, in a multiple regression analysis the null hypothesis is advanced
that there is no relationship between the predictor variable of primary interest
and the dependent variable, controlling for the effect of the other predictor
variable(s) on the dependent variable, and all of the predictor variables and
the dependent variable. In the context of the present research, the null
hypothesis is in contrast to the research hypotheses that executions have a
significant negative effect on homicide rates, controlling for the effect of other
factors on homicides, and homicide rates are significantly related to the
combined effects of all of the predictor variables. In the former case, the
concern is with the significance of the partial regression coefficient for the
execution variable (B and beta values). In the latter case, the concern is with
the significance of the multiple correlation coefficient (R2 ) when all of the
predictor variables are considered.
If it can be assumed that the units being examined (the sample) are
representative of the units to which the researcher wishes to make an
inference (the population), then statistical tests are available to test the
validity of the null hypothesis and, accordingly, the validity of the research
hypothesis. The t and F tests are two such tests that can be used in regression
analyses in order to make a population inference on the basis of examining
sample data.94 With both t and F tests the explicit concern is with making a
probability statement (with as small a degree of error as possible) that the
findings (B, beta, R2 values) observed for the sample are representative of the
relationship between the predictor and dependent variables in the popula-
tion.
Short of considering complete population data, sampling may result in the
to believe that the units that are selected for the sample are unlike the units in the overall
population. That is, if the sample does differ from the population, it will differ only by chance,
and, as pointed out in a later secton of the Appendix to this article, the effect of such chance
variation will steadily decrease as the proportion of the population included in the sample
increases.
"I The t and F tests are statistical techniques that can be used to determine the validity of the
null hypothesis (that there is no relationship between the predictor and dependent variables for
the population) and, accordingly, the validity of the research hypothesis (that the hypothesized
relationship between the predictor and dependent variables does hold for the population). Both t
and F tests are based upon the size of the sample that is being considered and the size of the B,
beta, and R2 values observed for the sample.
If the null hypothesis is correct for the population, then the observed B, beta, and R2 values for
the sample should be zero, i.e., there is no association between the variables in question.
However, even if the null hypothesis is correct (and the research hypothesis is incorrect), the B,
beta, and R2 values for the sample may not be zero due to sampling error, i.e., due to
unrepresentative units being included in the sample. The probability of such an occurrence
decreases, however, as the proportion of the population included in the sample increases.
The t and F tests are statistical techniques designed to determine the probable effect of
sampling error on B, beta, and R2 values observed for a sample. In general terms, the larger the
observed B, beta, and R2 values, the larger the corresponding t and F values, and the larger the t
and F values, the greater the probability that the null hypothesis is correct that the predictor and
dependent variables are related for the population. For a more detailed and technical discussion
of t and F tests, see H. BLALOCK, supra note 87, at 493-97; A. EDWARDS, supra note 87, at 103-13; J.
KMENTA, supra note 87, at 112-53; N. NOMODIrU, L. CARTa & H. BLALOCK, supra note 87, at 167-79.
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selection of unrepresentative observations. (When complete population data
are being examined, there is no possibility of sampling error since the total
population of interest is being considered in the analysis. Accordingly, B,
beta, and R2 values describe the relationship between the predictor and
dependent variables for the population.) As a general rule, however, the
researcher has a greater degree of confidence that the relationships observed
for the sample will reflect the relationships of concern in the population if a
proper procedure has been followed in selecting a sample of observations to
consider and a sufficiently large number of observations have been included
in the sample. As noted above, random sampling procedures are typically
utilized in order to achieve a representative sample of the population of
interest.9 5 In addition, the larger the proportion of the population that is
included in the sample, the greater the confidence that the sample data will
yield an accurate reflection of the population.
Based upon these two considerations, t and F tests permit a population
inference to be made on the basis of sample data when multiple regression is
used.96 Either t or F tests can be used in assessing the statistical significance of
B and beta coefficients, and the F test is used to assess the statistical
significance of R2 values. These statistical inference tests allow the researcher
to make a probability statement, with a specified degree of error, that values
of B, beta, and R2 are as large, or larger, for the population as the values for
these statistics observed for the sample. The larger the size of the t and F
values, the greater the confidence (probability) that the null hypothesis is
incorrect (e.g., B > 0, beta > 0, R2 > 0), and the greater the probability that
the research hypothesis is correct. It is important to emphasize that t and F
tests only permit a probability statement to be made about the relationship
between the variables of interest in the population. As noted above,97
whenever less than complete population data (a sample) are being examined,
there is always the possibility that a certain degree of sampling error will
result.
By convention in the social sciences, researchers have adopted the rule-of-
thumb of not considering as statistically significant any B, beta, or R2 value
unless its corresponding t or F value reaches at least what is termed the .05
level of statistical significance. The .05 level simply means that there is only a
five percent chance (probability) that a B value, for example, is actually zero
in the population (that the null hypothesis is correct), but due to sampling
error the observed B value for the sample is greater than zero. Conversely, the
.05 level of significance indicates that there is a 95 percent chance
(probability) that the B value is not zero in the population and that the
population B value is as large, or larger, than that observed for the sample.
The larger the t and F values associated with the B, beta, and R 2
coefficients derived from the sample data, the greater the probability that the
same pattern of B, beta, and R2 values also hold for the population. For
example, for B values that have a t or F statistic that is statistically significant at
the .01 level, there is only a one percent chance that the null hypothesis is
'5 See note 93 supra.
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correct (B = 0.0) and a 99 percent chance that the B value for the population is
as large, or larger, than that observed for the sample. Similarly, for B values
that have a t or F statistic that is significant at the .001 level, there is only a one-
tenth of one percent chance that the null hypothesis is correct (B = 0.0) and a
99.9 percent chance that the B value for the population is as large, or larger,
than that observed for the sample. The same logic and interpretation also
applies in assessing the statistical significance of beta and R2 values.
For the analysis reported in Tables 1-6 in this article, the .05, .01, and .001
levels of statistical significance are utilized in describing the results of the
regression analysis for the B, beta, and R2 coefficients, respectively. The
significance level of the coefficients is indicated by a letter code that appears
with the F values for each variable in the tables; letters "a," "b," and "c" signify
statistical significance at the .05, .01, and .001 levels, respectively. An F value
not accompanied by a letter code indicates that the predictor variable in
question is not significantly related to the dependent variable at at least the .05
level. Such predictor variables are not considered as significantly related
to homicide rates in this analysis.
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TABLE 1




Ind. Variable B Coeff. Beta Coeff. F Value
Pro. Male Pop. 475.4065 2.0493 13.914b
Pro. Age 20-40 yrs. -29.1424 -1.1005 29.032c
Pro. Nonwhite Pop. -97.3880 -. 9368 1.554
Pct. Unemployed -.5370 -. 4738 17.939c
Pro. Urban Pop. 46.8356 1.1687 12.901b
Execution Rate -. 0450 -. 0227 .070
Constant = -245.3883
R 2 = .904
F = 32.837c
Mean Homicide Rate Results
Pro. Male Pop. 498.0242 2.2146 36.600c
Pro. Age 20-40 yrs. -30.2000 -1.1765 74.730c
Pro. Nonwhite Pop. -77.4306 -. 7684 2.355
Pct. Unemployed -.5189 -. 4723 40.152c
Pro. Urban Pop. 40.6956 1.0476 23.347c
Execution Rate -. 0367 -. 0191 0.111
Constant = -253.4376
R 2 = .957
F = 78.345c
a = P<.05; b = P<.01; c=P<.001
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TABLE 2
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OHIO EXECUTION RATES,
SELECTED SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES AND
HOMICIDE RATES, WITH A ONE-YEAR TME LAG
BETWEEN EXECUTION AND HOMICIDE RATES
Homicide Rate Results
Ind. Variable B Coeff. Beta Coeff. F Value
Pro. Male Pop. 475.1206 2.0481 13.623c
Pro. Age 20-40 yrs. -29.3230 -1.1073 30.224c
Pro. Nonwhite Pop. -98.0746 -. 9434 1.495
Pet. Unemployed -.5384 -.4751 17.989c
Pro. Urban Pop. 46.8762 1.1697 12.616b




Mean Homicide Rate Results
Pro. Male Pop. 505.5902 2.2483 36.821c
Pro. Age 20-40 yrs. -30.3787 -1.1834 77.426c
Pro. Nonwhite Pop. -72.3417 -. 7178 1.942
Pct. Unemployed -. 5184 -. 4719 39.609c
Pro. Urban Pop. 39.9068 1.0273 21.924c
Execution Rate -. 0156 -. 0079 .019
Constant = -256.9396
R 2 = .957
F = 77.896c
a = P<.05; b-P<.01; c = P<.001
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TABLE 3




Ind. Variable B Coeff. Beta Coeff. F Value
Pro. Male Pop. 474.2687 2.0444 17.858c
Pro. Age 20-40 yrs. -28.9157 -1.0919 29.899c
Pro. Nonwhite Pop. -95.9210 -. 9227 2.134
Pct. Unemployed -.5485 -.4839 18.957c
Pro. Urban Pop. 47.1323 1.1761 16.922c




Mean Homicide Rate Results
Pro. Male Pop. 506.7280 2.2533 47.540c
Pro. Age 20-40 yrs. -30.2776 -1.1795 76.445c
Pro. Nonwhite Pop. -70.7926 -. 7025 2.710
Pct. Unemployed -.5208 -.4740 39.859c
Pro. Urban Pop. 39.8305 1.0253 28.182c
Execution Rate -. 0788 -. 0158 .104
Constant = -257.5739
R 2 = .957
F = 78.315c
a = P<.05; b = P < .01; c=P<.001
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TABLE 4
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OHIO EXECUTION RATES,
SELECTED SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
AND LOG HoMIcWE RATES
Homicide Rate Results
Ind. Variable B Coeff. Beta Coeff. F Value
Pro. Male Pop. 52.6725 1.2675 6.285a
Pro. Age 20-40 yrs. -4.3930 -. 9261 24.273c
Pro. Nonwhite Pop. -33.7920 -1.8146 6.884a
Pct. Unemployed -.0920 -. 4530 19.356c
Pro. Urban Pop. 10.0855 1.4049 22.011c




Mean Homicide Rate Results
Pro. Male Pop. 57.3132 1.4039 16.673c
Pro. Age 20-40 yrs. -4.5885 -. 9846 59.337c
Pro. Nonwhite Pop. -29.8678 -1.6326 12.051b
Pct. Unemployed -.0888 -. 4454 40.474c
Pro. Urban Pop. 8.8408 1.2536 37.899c
Execution Rate -.0036 -. 0104 .037
Constant = -29.2556
R 2 = .962
F = 89.277c
a=P<.05; b = P<.01; c = P<.001
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TABLE 5
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OHIO EXECUTION RATES,
SELECTED SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
AND HOMICIDE RATES, WITH A ONE-YEAR TIME LAG
BETWEEN EXECUTION AND Loc HOMICIDE RATES
Homicide Rate Results
Ind. Variable B Coeff. Beta Coeff. F Value
Pro. Male Pop. 52.7885 1.2703 6.187a
Pro. Age 20-40 yrs. -4.4104 -. 9297 25.156c
Pro. Nonwhite Pop. -33.7525 -1.8125 6.516a
Pct. Unemployed -.0921 -.4535 19.2 52 c
Pro. Urban Pop. 10.0742 1.4034 2 1.439c
Execution Rate -.0038 -.0105 .017
Constant = -27.6505
R 2 = .918
F = 39.3 92c
Mean Homicide Rate Results
Pro. Male Pop. 57.8433 1.4169 16.630c
Pro. Age 20-40 yrs. -4.6052 -. 9882 61.397c
Pro. Nonwhite Pop. -29.5224 -1.6137 11.159b
Pct. Unemployed -. 0888 -. 4454 40.127c
Pro. Urban Pop. 8.7857 1.2458 36.501c
Execution Rate -. 0021 -. 0059 .012
Constant = -29.4990
R 2 = .962
F = 89.166c
a=P<.05; b=P<.01; c = P<.001
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TABLE 6
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OHIO RESIDUAL EXECUTION RATES,
SELECTED SOCIODEMOGBAPHIC VARIABLES
AND LOG HOMICIDE RATES
Homicide Rate Results
Ind. Variable B Coeff. Beta Coeff. F Value
Pro. Male Pop. 51.6973 1.2440 7.766a
Pro. Age 20-40 yrs. -4.3482 -. 9166 24.745c
Pro. Nonwhite Pop. -34.1466 -1.8336 9.896b
Pet. Unemployed -. 0937 -. 4615 20.251c
Pro. Urban Pop. 10.2130 1.4227 2 9.081c
Execution Rate -. 0431 -. 0466 .486
Constant = -27.1886
R 2 = .920
F = 40.348c
Mean Homicide Rate Results
Pro. Male Pop. 58.2698 1.4273 21.614c
Pro. Age 20-40 yrs. -4.5988 -. 9868 60.636c
Pro. Nonwhite Pop. -29.1576 -1.5938 15.807c
Pct. Unemployed -.0889 -. 4459 39.972c
Pro. Urban Pop. 8.7441 1.2399 46.700c




a = P<.05; b=P<.01; c=P<.001
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